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Three Policies widely used by governments around the world--market price supports, direct
payments, and input subsidies--are analyzed for their implications for resource use and
effectiveness in transferring income to growers.  Results indicate that direct payments are the
most effective while input subsidies are least effective in transferring income to farmers.  All
policies result in expanded input use with input subsidies having the largest effect while direct
payments have the least impact.Qsi ’ (i[Ej *ij X
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ij ]
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Government Policies and their Effects on Resource Use 
in the U.S. Grain and Oilseed Sectors
More than a decade ago, the OECD Secretariat and USDA’s Economic Research Service
initiated the measurement of producer and consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs/CSEs) and the
modeling of the trade impacts of various policies (Ballenger, 1988; Cahill and Legg, 1990;
OECD, 1987; Roningen and Dixit, 1989, 1991).  These modeling exercises used PSEs/CSEs (as
aggregate commodity price wedges) to proxy the policy regime without any consideration to the
mix of policy instruments in existence.  
In recent years, governments have adjusted their policy instruments for providing support,
relying less on market price support and more on direct payments and other forms of support.  To
what degree have the changes in policy mix impacted various indicator variables important to
policy makers, such as taxpayer and consumer costs, producer income, resource use, and trade? 
This paper describes the analytical framework within which, using the information on support
levels provided by the PSE, we can examine such questions.  
The Modeling Framework     
The modeling framework used in this analysis is an intermediate-run static, partial
equilibrium, net-trade model, and factor markets are modeled explicitly.  The model is an
adaptation of the partial equilibrium farm sector model described by Gardner (1987).  A single-
product CES production function is used to represent the technology of food grains, feed grains,
and oilseeds production.  All markets are assumed competitive, equilibrium in factor markets
assumes autarky, while outputs are traded internationally and the rest of the world is represented
through export demand equations
Production equations
Production of each of the three outputs is a function of nine inputs.  Production
technology is represented by a Constant Elasticity Substitution (CES) technology.2
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  i= wheat, 2: feed grains, 3: oilseeds
j=1: other purchased inputs, 2: fertilizer, 3: chemicals, 4: hired labor, 
           5: irrigation, 6: energy, 7: capital, 8: insurance, 9: nonpurchased inputs
where Qsi is output of commodity i,  Xij  is the quantity of input j used in the production of
commodity i indexed over j, (i is the efficiency parameter ((i > 0),  *ij  is the distribution
parameter of input j for commodity i, (3j *j = 1) and Di  is the substitution parameter for
commodity i with (-1<Di). 
Commodity demand equations
Demand for each commodity is assumed to be a multiplicative function of the consumer
price of all commodities, and is represented by constant elasticity functions.  Commodities are
linked in these equations through cross-price elasticities of demand.  Therefore, substitution
among commodities is allowed for consumers.  Each demand equation contains a set of demand
shifters, such as the level and distribution of disposable income, representing all exogenous
variables affecting demand but excluded from the analysis.  The value of the demand shifters is
embodied in the base year, and since the policies examined are not expected to affect the value of
these shifters, only the impact of changes in prices is modeled. 
where Qdi is quantity demanded of commodity i, µi is the demand constant for commodity i,  Pck
is the price consumers pay for commodity k, and 8ik are the own- and cross-price elasticities of the
i
th  commodity.  Exports (Qxi) of each commodity is the difference between the quantity produced
and domestic consumption of commodity i.   
Factor demand equations
Factor demand is derived from the marginal revenue product (MRP) equation for factor  j 
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factor demand equations are functions of output price, input price, the elasticity of substitution,
the efficiency parameter, the distribution parameter, and output level.  
where X
d
ij is demand for input j in production of output i, Wd j  is the price the producer pays for
input j, and Pqi is the price producers receive for commodity i.  Total demand for factor  j  (X
d
j)
equals the aggregate of the demand for input j used in wheat, feed grains and oilseed production.
Factor supply equations
Supply of each input is assumed to be a simple function of its price, and is represented by
constant elasticity functional form.  
where X
s
j  is the total quantity of factor j supplied, aj is the constant of factor j , Wsj is the market
price that suppliers of factor j receive, and .j  is the supply elasticity of factor j in the sector.  In
equilibrium, the total quantity of factor j supplied, X
s
j, equals the quantity demanded of the factor. 
Price and policy linkage equations
The policy structure of the model is embedded in equations linking domestic (producer)
price to world price.  Policies are captured through links to prices.  For this exercise, we include
only three of the five categories of agricultural policies considered in the PSE calculations: 
market price support (mps), income support (direct) payments (dp), and input subsidies (isub).  
World price Pwi for commodity i is a function of U.S. exports.  The equation is
represented by a constant elasticity function:4
Pqi ’ Pwi % mps . (6)
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where Qxj  is the quantity of commodity j exported (which is endogenously determined in the
model) and  >ij is the export price flexibility of commodity i with respect to exports of commodity
j.  The price flexibility of export demand summarizes in one parameter the reactions of both
exporting and importing countries to a change in export quantity by the United States.
Producer price (Pqi) is a function of world price and the per-unit mps rate.   (Marketing
margins are not modeled explicitly, but assuming they do not change as a result of the various
experiments, the results are not materially affected).  If the world price is lower than the producer
price (positive mps), then producers are effectively being subsidized.  A negative transfer can
occur when policies keep internal prices below world prices (e.g., export tax).   
Consumer price (Pci) is also derived from the world price for commodity i.  Market price
support, consumer subsidies, and other subsidies may affect consumer price.  A positive mps
indicates an implicit tax where consumers pay higher prices, either because of a price floor or the
existence of export subsidies.  In addition, the consumer price may include direct subsidies (Csub)
derived from demand enhancing programs.  Consumer subsidies reduce the price of consumption.  
Input prices are determined domestically.  For purchased inputs, the price the providers of input j
receive, W
s
j, may differ from the price farmers pay, W
d
j, if input subsidies, isub, are provided.  
Input subsidies, therefore, expand the use of the input beyond the profit maximization level in the
absence of subsidies.  Input subsidies can be generic (available to all inputs) or input-specific, and
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The nonpurchased, or farmer-owned, input represents the bundle of land, fixed capital,
and producers’ own-labor, and it is modeled similarly to purchased inputs--its demand is derived
from the profit maximization conditions and there is a representative supply schedule reflecting
the opportunity cost of providing additional units of the input.  A major distinction is that the
nonpurchased input is commodity-specific and its supply is much less elastic, reflecting the
relative fixity of this factor in agriculture--relative to purchased inputs, larger price increases are
needed to induce an additional unit of supply.  In addition, the input subsidies discussed above,
isub, are not available to nonpurchased inputs; rather, we assume that direct payments, dp, induce
agricultural producers to supply more of the nonpurchased bundle relative to the profit
maximization level.  In this sense, direct payments act as other subsidies, and create a wedge








represents market returns.  This differs across the commodities, reflecting that returns differ
across crops, in contrast to factor price of purchased inputs.  Direct payments can be generic
(available to all producers) or crop-specific, and as modeled, act to increase the supply of the
nonpurchased bundle above the amount that would otherwise be provided.  
Equilibrium in the model is attained through market clearing conditions for each of the
outputs and inputs.  Equilibrium for the output markets reflects links to world markets through
exports, while equilibrium in the factor markets assumes autarky.  These markets are all in
equilibrium through market clearing conditions used to enforce the equality of supply and demand
in both commodity and factor markets.  
Calibration and Policy Scenarios
The model is calibrated to represent the market and policy conditions for 1995, the last year of the
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA 90).  The PSE/CSE data base1  Data and parameters used are available from author upon request.
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from the OECD with some modifications are used as an indicator of taxpayer and consumer
transfers to agriculture in 1995, and to generate the wedges in various prices in the model.  Many
of the parameters in the model were generated by the OECD’s AGLINK model, and the rest
gleaned from the literature
1. 
Three policy instruments; 1) market price support, 2) direct payments, and 3) input
subsidies, are examined for their effects on output, consumption, trade, resource use, and welfare
(consumer and producer).  In addition, an income transfer efficiency index is computed to indicate
the relative effectiveness of the policies to deliver income to farmers.  
A total of five policy scenarios are examined--two types of market price support; a)
targeted for wheat, and b) available to all three commodities; two types of input subsidies, a)
targeted for only those inputs that were subsidized during 1995, and b) available to all purchased
inputs; and one direct payment which is not targeted.  
Starting with 1995 support levels, we assume the additional infusion of $100 million of
support, i.e., an increase in the value of the PSE by $100 million sequentially as market price
support, direct payments, or input subsidies.  Total support is converted into a per-unit subsidy,
and results are reported as changes in income, welfare, resource use, production, or exports due
to an additional $1 of support.  We allow endogenously determined supports to adjust as needed
to ensure that exactly $100 million of additional support is provided, but the total PSE at the end
of the experiment may be above the initial $100-million because base-year policies continue.
Results
The first counter-factual experiment is to examine the effects of increasing expenditures on
a targeted export subsidy program (like the Export Enhancement Program) for wheat.  Increasing
market price support by $1.00 causes producer and domestic consumer prices to increase
$.09/ton, but leaves the price of coarse grains and oilseeds unchanged.  Higher wheat price
expands input demand stimulating wheat production while the higher prices contract domestic
consumption, leading to larger wheat exports.  Added input demand leads to higher input prices,
higher costs, and a fall in input demand by coarse grain and oilseed producers.  However, the7
added demand by wheat producers more than compensates, leading to a net increase (except for
irrigation water) in input demand (table 1).  Production of coarse grains and oilseeds declines due
to higher costs, but domestic consumption expands as consumers substitute away from higher
price wheat, leading to a fall in exports (table 2).  The effect of the policy is to lower welfare,
especially of wheat consumers as total consumer surplus is estimated to fall by about $0.31.  In
addition, taxpayer costs (in the form of additional export subsidies) increase about $0.53.  The
beneficiaries of the subsidy are the suppliers of the purchased inputs, whose aggregate producer
surplus increases $0.23; and foreign consumers, especially of wheat, whose consumer surplus
increases $0.21.  Farm households also benefit from the subsidy, as aggregate income increases
$0.35.  However, this is somewhat misleading because the sole beneficiaries are wheat producers
whose income expands $0.48 while returns to coarse grain and oilseed producers fall.
Increasing market price support by $1 (not targeted to a specific commodity) causes
domestic producer and consumer price of each output to increase by about $0.01/ton.  Increased
output price expands demand for factors of production and stimulates production while domestic 
consumption contracts, causing exports to increase and world prices to decline by about
$0.02/ton.  The fall in consumption and increase in consumer prices leads to a drop in consumer
surplus, estimated for all three crops to be about $0.31, with consumers of feed grains suffering
the largest decline in surplus.  The additional cost to taxpayers is $0.27, lower than the previous
scenario due to lower export subsidies.  The beneficiaries of the subsidy are the suppliers of the
purchased inputs, whose aggregate producer surplus increases $0.17; farm households, whose
income increases $0.24; and foreign consumers of these commodities, whose consumer surplus
increases about $0.15.  Providing a general rather than targeted market price support, lowers total
taxpayer and consumer cost to $.58 from $.85; lowers benefits to presumably unintended
beneficiaries, foreign consumers and suppliers of purchased inputs; and although the increase in
aggregate farm household income is lower, gains accrue to each group of producers, not just
producers of the targeted commodity.
Increased support in the form of direct payments, as may be expected, has smaller
impacts on production and consumption than does market price support.  Direct payments, as
modeled, are available to all producers and mimic deficiency payments in that market prices are8
not affected but producers have to remain in agriculture to receive them.  These payments lead to
an expansion in the supply of farm-owned inputs by increasing returns.  The additional supply
expands production, lowers output prices, and expands domestic consumption and exports (the
magnitude of changes are smaller than for market price support).  Additional consumption and
lower prices increase domestic consumer welfare by about $0.14, with more than half of the
benefits accruing to feed grain consumers.  This form of support is more expensive to taxpayers;
the taxpayer and consumer costs of direct payments increase by $0.86.  But, if the objective of
supports is to transfer income to farm households while minimizing transfers to overseas
consumers and input suppliers, direct payments are much better instrument than market price
support.  A $1 increase in direct payments results in a 67-cent increase in farm household income,
but only a 2-cent increase in producer surplus of input suppliers and a 5-cent increase in consumer
surplus of overseas consumers.
During 1995, U.S. programs subsidized use of irrigation water, capital, and insurance. 
The targeted input subsidy assumes that only these three inputs are subsidized.  An additional
$1.00 input subsidy lowers the cost of using these inputs, expands production of each output,  and
increases demand for all inputs, with the demand of the targeted inputs expanding the most.  The
additional production lowers prices and increase domestic consumption and exports, leading to
lower world prices.  This policy has a relatively hefty cost to taxpayers, but consumers gain  as
their surplus increases about $0.43, leading to total taxpayer and consumer costs which is lower
than targeted mps or dp.  Foreign consumers also benefit as their consumer surplus increases
$0.16.  As one would expect, increasing input subsidies leads to increasing returns for input
suppliers, as their producer surplus expands $0.26, with the providers of the subsidized inputs
reaping the majority of the benefits.  Striking is the relatively small pass-through to farmers as
farm household income increases only $0.09.
The results are not materially different when the input subsidy is not targeted to any input. 
Additional general input subsidies reduce input prices and expand demand for inputs.  Changes
in demand for inputs however, is not skewed as was the case in the previous scenario.  Consumer
benefit the most with this instrument as consumer surplus increases $0.47, and the combined
taxpayer and consumer cost is the lowest.  Foreign consumers once again benefit as their9
consumer surplus increases.  Total returns to providers of inputs is very similar to above, but the
distribution of benefits among the provides is more widespread and not concentrated as in the
targeted case.  It seems that input subsidies, whether targeted or not, are equally ineffective in
transferring income to farmers; their income increases only $0.09.  
Summary and Conclusions
Several observations are apparent from the results.  First, a $1 increase in transfer
payments to the farm sector through any of the components of agricultural policy leads to a lesser
change in domestic farm income.  The rest of the monetary transfer accrues either to other agents
in domestic markets, foreign consumers/producers, or deadweight losses (inefficient use of
resources).  Additionally, increased support, even when made available to all participants, has
different impacts,  largely because changes in transfers to the US farm sector lead not only to
changes in the level of support but also to changes in supply and demand.  These supply and
demand changes differ in magnitude and direction, allowing for a different allocation of resources
in the factor and commodity markets.  
Second, among the policies examined, direct payments expand farm household income the
most.  A dollar of support transferred through direct payments increases farm income by 67 cents. 
Transfer efficiency--the ratio of the change in farm household income to the change in total
consumer and taxpayer costs--captures how effectively a given output subsidy transfers income to
farm households.  Transfer efficiency of direct payments is 78 percent, by far the highest among
the policies considered, while input subsidies are the least efficient in transferring income to
farmers.  The transfer efficiency of targeted input subsidies is 15 percent, while the transfer
efficiency of market price supports is  40 percent.  This suggests that policy shifts towards direct
payments are beneficial to farmers.  In addition, we modelled direct payments as providing
incentives for farm households to expand the use of their land and labor.  To the extent that the
flexibility contracts are completely decoupled, transfer efficiency should be even higher with the
new program.  Direct payments also reduce transfer leakages to input suppliers and foreign
consumers.
Third, the increased transfer efficiency of direct payments comes with relatively high
taxpayer costs, while domestic consumers incur most of the costs of  market price supports.  The10
most consumer-friendly policy is also least beneficial to farmers--input subsidies.  When taxpayer
and consumer costs are combined, direct payments have the highest cost per $1 of support, while
input subsidies are the least costly.  In short, $1 of additional support has very different impacts
depending on how it is transferred, and very little of the transfer may make it to the intended
beneficiaries.  
Fourth, the trade distortion of additional support, measured by increased exports, is
mitigated  through direct payments, while targeted market price supports are most distorting.  For
example, an additional $1 in targeted market price support results in additional wheat exports that
are 36 times greater than additional exports with the same level of support through direct
payments.  Additional exports and lower world prices that result from more support benefit
foreign consumers of US grains and oilseeds.  Direct payments minimize the transfer to foreign
consumers, while foreign consumers of US grains and oilseeds benefit the most from US input
subsidies.  In fact, input subsidies are better at transferring welfare to foreign consumers ($0.17),
than to domestic farmers ($0.09).  
Fifth, policies have differential effects on resource utilization in agriculture.  Input
subsidies are not only ineffective in transferring income to farmers, they also tend to exacerbate
pollution potential of agriculture by increasing demand for fertilizers, chemicals, and fossil fuels;
inputs with potential to increase pollution.  Direct payments are more environmentally benign
because they tend to minimize changes in output and input use.  11
Table 1.  Changes in input use from $1 increase in support as either market price support, direct
payments, or input subsidies.
                                                     Market price Support          Direct payments         Input subsidies
                                                   Wheat        General            General           Targeted          General
Other purchased inputs (units)  0.220 0.132 0.014 0.044 0.210
Irrigation -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.025 0.210
Fertilizer 0.082 0.068 0.005 0.013 0.089
Chemicals 0.007 0.035 0.004 0.013 0.058
Energy 0.033 0.023 0.002 0.006 0.035
Hired labor 0.015 0.011 0.001 0.004 0.018
Capital 0.034 0.028 0.003 0.188 0.048
Insurance 0.055 0.026 0.003 0.180 0.04612
Table 2.  Impacts of $1 increase in support as either market price support, direct payments, or input
subsidies.
                                                     Market price Support          Direct payments         Input subsidies
                                                      Wheat              General            General           Targeted          General
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Total 0.532 0.272 1.001 1.009 1.010
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    ($)
Total -0.846 -0.581 -0.861 -0.584 -0.544
Change in
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Total 0.228 0.166 0.018 0.265 0.262
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Total 0.347 0.239 0.671 0.090 0.091
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TPC=Taxpayer costs   CS=consumer surplus   ISS= input supplier surplus   FHI=farm household income
FCS=foreign consumer surplus13
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